Case Citations of Parents Fundamental Rights to Maintain Their Relationship With Their Children

1. A "Strict scrutiny standard is require
2. The parents right must be maintained lacking a showing by this strict standard that the parent is "unfit".

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Good Summary

Date: Mon, 02 Jan 2006 20:22:47 -0000
From: "ravenwaverider" <ravenwaverider@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: INQUIRY??????????? CaseLaw4FamilyRights.txt

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In its order granting the Appellees' motion for summary judgment,
the district court began its analysis by setting forth the elements of a § 1983 claim against an individual state actor as follows:
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed constitutional right's of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the acts or omissions of the defendant were intentional;
(3) the defendant acted under color of law; and
(4) the acts or omissions of the defendant caused the constitutional deprivation. Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F.
Supp.2d 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The court also stated that, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the municipality had a policy or custom;
(3) this policy or custom amounts to deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff's] constitutional right; &
(4) the policy or custom caused constitutional deprivation.

My rights as a parents where violated:

The right of a parent to raise his children has long been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right, "far more precious than
property rights." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), quoting May v. Anderson, 345, U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), See, e.q. Castigno v Wholean, 239 Conn. 336 (1996); In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557 (1992). In Re: May V Anderson (1953) 345 US 528, 533, 73 S. Ct. 840, 843 97 L. Ed. 1221, 1226.

10/18/2000 Gatliff v. Sisson, No. CA A102854
http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A102854.htm

Criteria

1. Best Interest of Child
2. Must Show Harm
3. Prior Grandparent/Grandchild Relationship
4. Effect on Parent/Child Relationship
5. Any Marital Status of Parents
6. Parents are Deceased, Divorced and/or Unmarried.

United States Supreme Court Parental Rights Caselaw

In its order granting the Appellate' motion for summary judgment, the district court began its analysis by setting forth the elements
of a § 1983 claim against an individual state actor as follows:
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed constitutional right's of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the acts or omissions of the defendant were intentional;
(3) the defendant acted under color of law; and
(4) the acts or omissions of the defendant caused the constitutional deprivation. Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F.
Supp.2d 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The court also stated that, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the municipality had a policy or custom;
(3) this policy or custom amounts to deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff's] constitutional right; &
(4) the policy or custom caused constitutional deprivation.

In the early 1920s, the United States Supreme Court first reviewed the rights, liberties and obligations of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children. Two important decisions, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, established a legacy
which was followed by a series of decisions holding that parenting is a fundamental constitutional right, and among "the basic civil rights of man." Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among those rights the Court has ranked as "of basic importance in our society," and as sheltered by the 14th Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. Assembled here are a majority of those cases defining or reaffirming these fundamental rights. Links are provided to each case on the FindLaw Internet Legal Resources service. Each is in hypertext format, with links to related opinions of the court contained in the ruling.

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The construction of a constitutional theory which will protect various aspects of family life under Section 1983 rightly continues
to command a good deal of judicial interest.The right of a parent to raise his children has long been recognized
as a fundamental constitutional right, "far more precious than property rights." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972),
quoting May v. Anderson, 345, U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), See, e.q. Castigno v Wholean, 239 Conn. 336 (1996); In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557 (1992). In Re: May V Anderson (1953) 345 US 528, 533, 73 S. Ct. 840, 843 97 L. Ed. 1221, 1226, This case involved a mother stripped of her rights without the right to utter a single word in her defense. The order was originally granted for 6 months in which the court allowed the mother to "fight" for her rights back, but kept getting delayed so that the child would incur more time with the father. This case was reversed upon appeal, and also gave rise to the statute citing that, Presumption (750 ILCS 5/603) "A court may consider the period of time that a child has spent with a parent by virtue of a temporary custody order but there is no presumption in favor of the existing custodian under 750 ILCS 5/602 as there is in modification cases under 750 ILCS 5/610. In Re Hefer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 73, 217 Ill. Dec 701, 667 N.E. 2nd 1094 (4 Dist. 1996). Obviously, the argument is that one parent may manipulate the system to prolong proceedings that he/she may think there is an automatic award of custody. The 602 standards still are mandated to be applied, one of them including the wishes of the children as well as other issues such as safety and well-being of the children (self-mutilation, in this case due to psychological
and/or other abuse in the Petitioner/Mother's residence).

M. L. B. v. S. L. J.
___ US ___, 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996)
Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as "of basic
importance in our society," rights sheltered by the 14th Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or
disrespect. This case, involving the State's authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demanded the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association so undeniably important was at stake.


Santosky v Kramer 455 US 745 (1982)
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the 14th
Amendment, and does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. A parental rights termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty interest. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.

Lassiter v Department of Social Services 452 US 18 (1981)
The Court's decisions have by now made plain that a parent's desire for and right to "the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children" is an important interest that "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a
commanding one.

Quilloin v Walcott 434 US 246 (1978)
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a
natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason
that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest." Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the "best interests of the child."

Smith v Organization of Foster Care Families 431 US 816 (1977)
In this action, individual foster parents and a foster parents organization, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against New
York State and New York City officials, alleging that the statutory and regulatory procedures for removal of foster children from foster
homes violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. The ruling contains an analysis of the rights of
natural parents as balanced against the rights of foster parents, as well as a comprehensive discussion of foster care conditions.

Moore v East Cleveland 431 US 494 (1977)
The Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters have consistently acknowledged a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." When the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, the Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced.

Cleveland Board of Education v La Fleur 414 US 632 (1974)
The Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."

Stanley v Illinois 405 US 645 (1972)
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and protection. The
integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment, and the 9th Amendment.

Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205 (1972)
In this case involving the rights of Amish parents to provide for private schooling of their children, the Court held: "The history
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."

Loving v Virginia 388 US 1 (1967)
In this case involving interracial marriage, the Court reaffirmed the principles set forth in Pierce and Meyers, finding that marriage
is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival. "The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."

Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965)
The 4th and 5th Amendments were described as protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." The Court referred to the 4th Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right
carefully and particularly reserved to the people." Reaffirming the principles set forth in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyers v Nebraska.

Prince v Massachusetts 321 US 158 (1944)
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these
decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.

Skinner v Oklahoma 316 US 535 (1942)
"We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race."

Pierce v Society of Sisters 268 US 510 (1925)
The liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children was abridged by a proposed statute to compel
public education. "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."

Meyer v Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923)
"No state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." "While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."

The "liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests" recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. Troxel v.Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999). Moreover, the companionship, care, custody, and management of a parent over his or her child is an interest far more precious than any property right. May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533, (1952). As such, the parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).

The law has long recognized and respected the rights and duties of parents in the raising of children. The Supreme Court has been
consistent in recognizing the importance of respecting Parents authority in the raising of their children. Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has stated, "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first with the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

A corollary to this fundamental principle is that parents have broad discretion in the disciplining of their children and are allowed to
use corporal punishment. Under California state law, a parent has the right to reasonably discipline a child by physical punishment
and may administer reasonable punishment without being liable for battery.

People v. Whitehurst, 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050 (1992). In order to be considered disciplinary the punishment must be necessary (i.e.
there must be behavior by the child deserving punishment), and the punishment must be reasonable (i.e. not excessive). Id. It is
important to remember that the reasonableness of the punishment will be judged by a third party and it does not matter if the parent
believes the punishment was reasonable.

CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON
SUPREME COURT RULES 9-0
ON MARCH 8, 2004, SUPREME COURT RULES THAT HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IS NOT ADMISSIBLE. PARENTS HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THEIR ACCUSER UNDER THE 6TH AMENDMENT. COMPLY WITH THE 6TH AMENDMENT IN CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES.

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "a) The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. A parental rights termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty interest. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. Pp. 752-754."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. A "clear and convincing evidence" standard adequately conveys to the fact finder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands more than this. Before a State may sever the rights of parents in [455 U.S. 745, 748] their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "In Lassiter, it was "not disputed that state intervention to terminate the relationship
between [a parent] and [the] child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause." Id.,
at 37 (first dissenting opinion); see id., at 24-32 (opinion of the Court); id., at 59-60 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). See also Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). The absence of dispute reflected this Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice
in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 -640 (1974);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 -652 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 -535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to [455 U.S. 745, 754] destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), Lassiter declared it "plain beyond the need for multiple citation" that a natural
parent's "desire for and right to `the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children'" is an interest far more
precious than any property [455 U.S. 745, 759] right. 452 U.S., at 27 , quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at 651 . "When the State
initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end
it. "If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of deprivation A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the
decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one." 452 U.S., at 27.

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "At such a proceeding, numerous factors combine to magnify the risk of erroneous fact
finding. Permanent neglect proceedings employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S., at 835. Raising the standard of proof would have both practical and symbolic consequences. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., at 426 . The Court has long considered the heightened standard of proof used in criminal prosecutions to be "a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error." In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 363 . An elevated standard of proof in a parental rights termination proceeding would alleviate "the possible risk that a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic behavior." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., at 427 . "Increasing the burden of proof is one way to impress the fact
finder with the importance [455 U.S. 745, 765] of the decision and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inappropriate
terminations will be ordered. Ibid. The court's theory assumes that termination of the natural parents' rights invariably will benefit
the child. Yet we have noted above that the parents and the child share an interest in avoiding erroneous termination. Even accepting
the court's assumption, we cannot agree with its conclusion that a preponderance standard fairly distributes the risk of error between
parent and child. Use of that standard reflects the judgment that society is nearly neutral between erroneous termination of parental
rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring). For the child,
the likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is preservation of [455 U.S. 745, 766] an uneasy status quo. For the
natural parents, however, the consequence of an erroneous termination is the unnecessary destruction of their natural family.
A standard that allocates the risk of error nearly equally between those two outcomes does not reflect properly their relative severity.

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), Two state interests are at stake in parental rights termination proceedings - a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings. A standard of proof more strict than preponderance of the evidence is consistent with both interests."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "while there is still reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-child
relationships exist, the parens patriae interest favors preservation, not [455 U.S. 745, 767] severance, of natural familial
bonds. 17 384-b.1.(a)(ii). "[T]he State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of
fit parents." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at 652."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "The logical conclusion of this balancing process is that the "fair preponderance of the
evidence" standard prescribed by Fam. Ct. Act 622 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted in Addington: "The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual
is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state." 441 U.S., at 427. Thus, at a parental rights termination proceeding, a
near-equal allocation of risk between the parents and the State is constitutionally intolerable."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "The next question, then, is whether a "beyond a reasonable doubt" or a "clear and convincing" standard is constitutionally mandated. In Addington, the Court concluded that application of a reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings for two reasons - because of our hesitation to apply that unique standard "too broadly or casually in non-criminal cases," id., at 428, and because the psychiatric evidence ordinarily adduced at commitment proceedings is
[455 U.S. 745, 769] rarely susceptible to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 429-430, 432-433. To be sure, as has been noted
above, in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 102(f), 92 Stat. 3072, 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), Congress requires "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt" for termination of Indian parental rights, reasoning that "the removal of a child from the parents is a penalty as great [as], if not greater, than a criminal penalty" H. R. Rep. No. 95-1386, p. 22 (1978)."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "two federal courts have addressed the issue. Each has held that allegations supporting parental rights termination must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Sims v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1194 (SD Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Alsager v. District Court of [455 U.S. 745, 751] Polk County, 406 F. Supp. 10, 25 (SD Iowa 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 1137 (CA8 1976)."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "the standard of proof is a crucial component of legal process, the primary function of which is `to minimize the risk of [455 U.S. 745, 758] erroneous decisions.'" Post, at 785, quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). only the standard of proof "instruct[s] the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions" he draws from that information. In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring). The statutory provision of right to counsel and multiple hearings before termination cannot suffice to protect a
natural parent's fundamental liberty interests if the State is willing to tolerate undue uncertainty in the determination of the dispositive facts."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "The Family Court Judge in the present case expressly refused to terminate petitioners' parental rights on a "non-statutory, no-fault basis." App. 22-29. Nor is it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate a
parent's rights without showing parental unfitness. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). "We have little doubt that the
Due Process Clause would be offended `[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the
parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest,'" quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (1977)."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "Any parens patriae interest in terminating the natural parents' rights arises only at
the dispositional phase, after the parents have been found unfit."

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "a the interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently
fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, supra, at 862-863."

TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed. Finding: "... the Federal Constitution
permits a State to interfere with this right (infringing on parents' fundamental right to rear their children) only to prevent harm or potential harm to the child...".137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed."

TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed. "Justice Thomas agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct their children's upbringing resolves this case, but concluded that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to apply to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State lacks a compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision..."

TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed. "Justice O'Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, concluded that 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family, violates her due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters. Pp. 5ù17." "(a) The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests," Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, including parents' fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children, see, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651. Pp. 5ù8." "(b)".. broad statute effectively permits a court to disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best interest. A parent's estimation of the child's best interest is accorded no deference." (Arbitrary Classification at work)

TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed. "A combination of several factors compels the conclusion that 26.10.160(3) exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent. There is a presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602; there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best
decisions regarding their children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304."

TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed. "The ... Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight to determination of HER daughters' best interests." "it placed the burden of disproving that
visitation would be in her daughters' best interest and thus failed to provide any protection for her fundamental right." "These
factors, when considered with the ... Court's slender findings, show that this case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement
between the court and Granville concerning her children's best interests, and that the visitation order was an unconstitutional
infringement on Granville' (the Parent's) right to make decisions regarding the rearing of her children. Pp. 8ù 14."

TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000) 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed. "Justice Thomas agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct their children's upbringing resolves this case, but concluded that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to apply to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State lacks a
compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision"

LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), 463 U.S. 248, "Where an father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact with his child acquires
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392."

CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), "a sex-based distinction in ... between a mothers and a fathers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it bears no substantial relation to any important state interest. Pp. 388-394. [441 U.S. 380, 381]. Gender-based distinctions "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives" in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental relationship with their children absent a finding that they are unfit as parents." Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S., at 76 , "statutory "classifications `must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)." Judical decisions on the basis of gender are therefore
arbitrary and UnConstitutional.

QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246. "In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), this Court held that the State of Illinois was barred, as a matter of both due process and equal protection, from taking custody of the children of a father,
absent a hearing and a particularized [434 U.S. 246, 248] finding that the father was an unfit parent. The Court concluded, on the one
hand, that a father's interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and management" of his children is "cognizable and substantial,"
id., at 651-652, and, on the other hand, that the State's interest in caring for the children is "de minimis" if the father is in fact
a fit parent, id., at 657-658." De Minimus defined: Trifling or insignificant matters, with which a court will not concern itself.
The full expression is de minimis non curat lex. This is a Latin phrase which means "the law does not care about very small matters".
It can be used to describe a component part of a wider transaction, where it is in itself insignificant or immaterial to the transaction
as a whole, and will have no legal relevance or bearing on the end result.

QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246, "a unless and until the child is legitimated, the mother is the only
recognized parent and is given exclusive authority to exercise all parental prerogatives, 74-203."

QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246, "We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972); Stanley v.
Illinois, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 -401 (1923). "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). And it is now firmly established that "freedom of personal
choice in matters of . . . family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 -640 (1974). We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be
offended "[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their
children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest."
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (1977).

MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), 'No state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.' While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much
consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co ., 111 U.S. 746 , 4 Sup. Ct. 652; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 , 6 Sup. Ct. 1064; Minnesota v. Bar er, 136 U.S. 313 , 10 Sup. Ct. 862; Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 , 17 Sup. Ct. 427; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Twining v. New Jersey 211 U.S. 78 , 29 Sup. Ct. 14; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 , 31 Sup. Ct. 259; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 , 36 Sup. Ct. 7, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Adams v. Tanner, 224 U.S. 590 , 37 Sup. Ct. 662, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 , 38 Sup. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 593; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 , 42 Sup. Ct. 124; Adkins v. Children's Hospital (April 9, 1923), 261 U.S. 525 , 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. --; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147. The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered [262 U.S. 390, 400] with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation
to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect. Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise
of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 , 14
S. Sup. Ct. 499."

Equal Protection Case Law CALIFANO v. GOLDFARB, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), "To withstand constitutional challenge, classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to [430 U.S. 199, 211] the achievement of
those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Such classifications, however, have frequently been revealed on analysis
to rest only upon "old notions" and "archaic and overbroad" generalizations, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S., at 14 ; Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S., at 508 ; cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 512 -513 (1976), and so have been found to offend the prohibitions
against denial of equal protection of the law. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, supra; Craig v. Boren, supra. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)."

LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), "The concept of equal justice under law requires the State to govern impartially. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 24 Specifically,
[463 U.S. 248, 266] it may not subject men and women to disparate treatment when there is no substantial relation between the
disparity and an important State purpose. Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 -199 (1976).

LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), Justice Stewart correctly observed: "Even if it be assumed that each married parent after divorce has some substantive due process right to maintain his or her parental relationship, cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (opinion concurring in judgment), it by no means follows that each unwed parent has any such right.
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more
enduring." 441 U.S., at 397 (emphasis added). In a similar vein, the other three dissenters in Caban were prepared to "assume that, if
and when one develops, the relationship between a father and his natural child is entitled to protection against arbitrary state
action as a matter of due process." Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 414 (emphasis added). [463 U.S. 248, 261]"

LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), "The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. When that Clause is invoked in a novel context, it is our practice to begin the inquiry with a determination of the precise nature of the private interest that is threatened by the State. We therefore first consider the nature of
the interest in liberty for which appellant claims constitutional protection and then turn to a discussion of the adequacy of the
procedure that New York has provided for its protection." "The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite
variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-
evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases. In deciding whether this is such a
case, however, we must consider the broad framework that has traditionally been used to resolve the legal problems arising from
the parent-child relationship" "When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing]
forward to participate in the rearing of his child," Caban, 441 U.S., at 392 , his interest in personal contact with his child
acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be said that he "act[s] as a father toward his children." Id., at 389, n. 7. But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds. "[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved
and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays
in `promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children . . . as well as from the fact of blood relationship." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 -233 (1972)). 17 [463 U.S. 248, 262]"

LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),".. the Federal Constitution supersedes state law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family relationships. In those cases, as in the state cases, the Court has emphasized the paramount interest in the
welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed. Thus,
the "liberty" of parents to control the education of their children that was vindicated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), was described as a "right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [the
child] for additional obligations." Id., at 535. The linkage between parental duty and parental right was stressed again in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), when the Court declared it a cardinal principle "that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside [463 U.S. 248, 258] first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder." Ibid. In these cases the Court has found that the relationship of love and duty in a recognized family
unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protection. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (plurality opinion). "[S]tate intervention to terminate [such a] relationship must be accomplished by procedures meeting the
requisites of the Due Process Clause." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).

LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), There are also a few cases in which this Court has considered the extent to which the
Constitution affords protection to the relationship between natural parents and children born out of wedlock. In some we have been
concerned with the rights of the children, see, e. g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). In this case, however, it is a parent who claims that the State has
improperly deprived him of a protected interest in liberty. This Court has examined the extent to which a natural father's biological
relationship with his child receives protection under the Due Process Clause in precisely three cases: Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972), Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), "The significance of the
biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship
with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the
blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do
so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie."

LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), "The Equal Protection Claim." The concept of equal justice under law requires the State to govern impartially. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 24 Specifically, [463 U.S. 248, 266] it may not subject men and women to disparate treatment when there is no substantial
relation between the disparity and an important state purpose. Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 -199 (1976).

LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), "In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), the Court held that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause to grant the mother a veto [over the adoption of a 4-year-old girl and a 6-year-old boy,] but not to grant a veto to
their father, who had admitted paternity and had participated in the rearing of the children. The Court made it clear, however, that if
the father had not "come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclud[e]
the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child." Id., at 392."

CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) "Gender, like race, is a highly visible and immutable characteristic that has historically
been the touchstone for pervasive but often subtle discrimination. Although the analogy to race is not perfect and the constitutional
inquiry therefore somewhat different, gender-based statutory classifications deserve careful constitutional examination because
they may reflect or operate to perpetuate mythical or stereotyped assumptions about the proper roles and the relative capabilities of
men and women that are unrelated to any inherent differences between the sexes. Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 . Sex-based classifications are in many settings invidious because they relegate a person to the place set aside for the group on the basis of an attribute that the person cannot change. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 ; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 ; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 ; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 ; Orr v. Orr, supra. Such laws cannot be defended, as can the bulk of the classifications that fill the statute books, simply on the ground that the generalizations they reflect may be true of the majority of members of the class, for a gender-based classification need not ring false to work a discrimination that in the individual case might be
invidious."'... parental rights without proof of unfitness on his part violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Secondarily, he attacks 111 (1) (c)'s disparate [441 U.S. 380, 402] treatment of natural mothers and
natural fathers as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the same Amendment." "if and when one develops, the relationship between a father and his natural child is entitled to protection against arbitrary state action as a matter of due process. See Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 "...some Members of the [US Supreme] Court have concluded that greater protection is due the "private
realm of family life," Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (emphasis added), e. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 "For
a traditional classification is more likely to be used without pausing to consider its justification than is a newly created
classification. Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female, alien
and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the same inertia in distinguishing between black
and white. But that sort of stereotyped reaction [441 U.S. 380, 404] may have no rational relationship other than pure prejudicial
discrimination - to the stated purpose for which the classification is being made."

Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 -521. First Amendment Rights U.S. Constitution, First Amendment pertaining to the right to
absolute religious freedom. Holy Bible, Matthew Chapter 28, verses 17-19: "The Great Commission of Jesus Christ" "Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you." Holy Bible, 2nd Corinthians, Chapter 5, Verse 20 -"a we are ambassadors for Christa"; Holy Bible, Ephesians Chapter 6, verse 4 - "a Parents, do not provoke your children to anger, but bring them up in the discipline and
instruction of the Lord." Holy Bible, Deuteronomy Chapter 6, Verses 6¡7: "And you must think constantly about these commandments I am giving you today. You must teach them to your children and talk about them when you are at home or out for a walk; at bedtime and
the first thing in the morning." Holy Bible, Proverbs Chapter 22, Verse 6: "Train a child in the way he should go, and when he is old
he will not turn from it."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944) "rests squarely on freedom of religion under the First Amendment, applied by the
Fourteenth to the states. She buttresses this foundation, however, with a claim of parental right as secured by the due process clause
of the latter Amendment. 8 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446. "two claimed liberties are at stake. One is the parent's, to bring up the child in the way he should go, which for appellant means to teach him the tenets and the practices
of their faith. The other freedom is the child's, to observe these;" "If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of
conscience a broader protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the great liberties insured by the First
Article (US Constitution) can be given higher place than the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 , 60 S.Ct. 146; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A. L.R. 1352. All are interwoven there together.
Differences there are, in them and in the modes appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime place
because they have unity in their human sources and [321 U.S. 158, 165] functionings. Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith
and reasoned judgment are not the same. Spirit is not always thought. But in the everyday business of living, secular or
otherwise, these variant aspects of personality find inseparable expression in a thousand ways. They cannot be altogether parted in
law more than in life."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "To make accommodation between these freedoms and an exercise of state authority always is delicate. It hardly could be more so than in such a clash as this case presents. On one side is the obviously earnest claim for freedom of conscience and religious practice. With it is allied the parent's claim to authority in her own household and in the rearing of her children. The parent's conflict with the state over control of the child and his training is serious enough when only secular
matters are concerned. It becomes the more so when an element of religious conviction enters. Against these sacred private interests,
basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to protect the welfare of children, and the state's assertion of authority to that
end, made here in a manner conceded valid if only secular things were involved. The last is no mere corporate concern of official
authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens. Between contrary pulls of such weight, the safest
and most objective recourse is to the lines already marked out, not precisely but for guides, in narrowing the no man's land where this battle has gone on."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The rights of children to exercise their religion, and of parents to give them
religious training and to encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of
state power voicing it, have had recognition here, most recently in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. [321
U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178. Previously in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct. 571, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had sustained the parent's authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the state's requirement of attendance at public schools. "

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), And in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446, children's rights to receive teaching in languages other than the nation's common tongue were guarded against the state's encroachment. It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in
recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. But it is said
the state cannot do so here. This, first, because when state action impinges upon a claimed religious freedom, it must fall unless shown
to be necessary for or conducive to the child's protection against some clear and present danger, cf. Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 , 39 S.Ct. 247; and, it is added, there was no such showing here. " Accordingly, in view of the preferred position the freedoms
of the First Article occupy, the statute in its present application must fall. It cannot be sustained by any presumption of validity. Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 , 60 S.Ct. 146. And, finally, it is said, the statute is, as to children, an absolute prohibition, not merely a reasonable regulation, of the denounced activity."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), " "Religious training and activity, whether performed by adult or child, are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against interference by state action, except insofar as they violate reasonable regulations adopted for the protection of the public health, morals and welfare." "a The state court has construed these statutes to cover the activities here involved, cf. State v. Richardson, 92 N.H. 178, 27 A.2d 94, thereby imposing an indirect restraint through the parents and guardians on the free exercise by minors of their religious beliefs. This indirect restraint is no less effective than a direct one. A square conflict between the con- [321 U.S. 158, 173] stitutional guarantee of religious freedom and the state's legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its children is thus presented. In dealing with the validity of statutes which directly or indirectly infringe religious freedom and the right of parents to encourage their children in the practice of a religious belief, we are not aided by any strong presumption of the constitutionality of such legislation. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 , 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, note 4.

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "On the contrary, the human freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment and carried over into the Fourteenth Amendment are to be presumed to be invulnerable and any attempt to sweep away those freedoms is prima facie invalid. It follows that any restriction or prohibition must be justified by those who deny that the freedoms have been unlawfully invaded."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The great interest of the state in shielding minors from the evil vicissitudes of early
life does not warrant every limitation on their religious training and activities. If the right of a child to practice its religion in that manner is to be forbidden by constitutional means, there must be convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the child. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 , 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186.

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The vital freedom of religion, which is 'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152.""The state, in my opinion, has completely failed to sustain its burden of proving the existence of any grave or immediate danger to any interest which it may lawfully protect." "Nor can parents or guardians be subjected to criminal liability because of vague possibilities that their religious teachings might cause injury to the child. The evils must be grave, immediate, substantial. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 , 62 S.Ct. 190, 193. Yet there is not the slightest indication in this record, or in sources subject to judicial notice, that children engaged in distributing literature pursuant to their religious beliefs have been or are likely to be subject to any of the harmful 'diverse influences of the street.' Indeed, if probabilities are to be indulged in, the likelihood is that children engaged in serious religious endeavor are immune from such influences."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "No chapter in human history has been so largely written in terms of persecution and intolerance as the one dealing with religious freedom. From ancient times to the present day, the ingenuity of man has known no limits in its ability to forge weapons of oppression for use against rights of those [321 U.S. 158, 176]a" See Mulder and Comisky, 'Jehovah's Witnesses Mold Constitutional Law,' 2 Bill of Rights Review, No. 4, p. 262

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "To them, along with other present-day religious minorities, befalls the burden of
testing our devotion to the ideals and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom." "Religious freedom is too sacred a right to be
restricted or prohibited in any degree without convincing proof that a legitimate interest of the state is in grave danger. " "[ Footnote
8 ] The due process claim, as made and perhaps necessarily, extends no further than that to freedom of religion, since in the
circumstances all that is comprehended in the former is included in the latter. "

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "a claim of parental right as secured by the due process clause of the latter Amendment. 8 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446." PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "...two claimed liberties are at stake. One is the parent's, to bring up the child in the way he should go."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "ait is allied the parent's claim to authority in her own household and in the rearing
of her children. The parent's conflict with the state over control of the child and his training is serious enough when only secular
matters are concerned. "a" Against these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children, and the state's assertion of authority to that end, made here in a manner conceded valid if only secular things
were involved. The last is no mere corporate concern of official authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens. Between contrary pulls of such weight, the safest and most objective recourse is to the lines already marked out, not precisely but for guides, in narrowing the no man's land where this battle has gone on."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The rights of children to exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition here, most recently in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. [321 U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178. Previously in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct. 571, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had sustained the parent's authority to provide religiousa" "And in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446, children's rights to receive teaching in languages other than the nation's common tongue were guarded against the state's encroachment." "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "Religious training and activity, whether performed by adult or child, are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against interference by state action, except insofar as they violate reasonable regulations adopted for
the protection of the public health, morals and welfare....The state court has construed these statutes to cover the activities here involved, cf. State v. Richardson, 92 N.H. 178, 27 A.2d 94, thereby imposing an indirect restraint through the parents and guardians on the free exercise by minors of their religious beliefs. This indirect restraint is no less effective than a direct one. A square conflict between the con- [321 U.S. 158, 173] Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and the state's legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its children is thus presented." "The human freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment and carried over into the Fourteenth Amendment are to be presumed to be invulnerable and any attempt to sweep away those freedoms is prima facie
invalid."

PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The vital freedom of religion, which is 'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, cannot be erased by slender references to the state's power to
restrict the ... activities of children." "Nor can parents or guardians be subjected to liability because of vague possibilities that their religious teachings might cause injury to the child. The evils must be grave, immediate, substantial. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262, 62 S.Ct. 190, 193." PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "If the Murdock doctrine standsaa foundation is laid for any state intervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion, provided it is done in the name of their health or welfare. (Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 , 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 82; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 , 63 S.Ct. 862; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 , 141 A.L.R. 514; Id., 19 U.S. 103 , 63 S.Ct. 890; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct. 877, 882.)

MOORE v. EAST CLEVELAND, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), "(b) When the government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, the usual deference to the legislature is inappropriate; and the Court must examine carefully the importance
of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation." d) The strong
constitutional protection of the sanctity of the family established in numerous decisions of this Court extends to the family choice involved in this case and is not confined within an arbitrary boundary drawn at the limits of the nuclear family (essentially a couple [431 U.S. 494, 495] and their dependent children). Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but from careful "respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). The history and tradition of this Nation compel a larger conception of the family."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In 1798, when this Court was asked to hold another Connecticut law unconstitutional, Justice Iredell said: ""[I]t has been the policy of all the American states, which have, individually, framed their state constitutions since the revolution, and of the people of the United States, when they framed the Federal Constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void;"

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The principles laid down in this opinion [by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employers of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence, it is the
invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of [381 U.S. 479, 485]." In spite of having committed no
crimes OR being found unfit OR incompetent as a parent, my Right to Constitutional protection, Equal Treatment Under the Law and My God Given Liberties as a Law Abiding Citizen of the United States of America, have been violated by the Circuit Court for Howard County Maryland, and the State Maryland. My personal property - my children - have been effectively seized and without a Constitutional basis OR the "clear establishment of unfitness as a parent" as mandated by Federal case law.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." "the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307. GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." * We recently referred [381 U.S. 479, 485] in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 , to the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people." See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960).

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Court stated many years ago that the Due Process Clause protects those liberties that are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." The [state] is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness, unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 , 111 S., 112, 29 S.Ct. 14; Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 , 26 S.Ct. 87; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604 , 20 S.Ct. 494; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , 4 S.Ct. 111, 292; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 , 35 S.Ct. 582; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 , 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so rooted [there] a as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 . The inquiry is whether a right involved "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those `fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions' a." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
67 . "Liberty" also "gains content from the emanations of . . . specific [constitutional] guarantees" and "from experience with the
requirements of a free society." Poe [381 U.S. 479, 494] v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." [381 U.S. 479, 495]."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's statement in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 -552: "Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right. Of this whole `private realm of family life'
it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations." By Extension of
Natural Law, this same level of Constitutional protection of Family Rights must be extended to the unemancipated minor offspring of that lawful and law abiding marital relation û even in event of marital divorce.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it offers these fundamental rights no protection. The fact that no particular provision of the Constitution [381 U.S. 479, 496] explicitly forbids the State from disrupting the traditional relation of the family - a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization - surely does not show that the Government was meant to have the power to do so. Rather, as the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as this one, which are protected from abridgment by the Government though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution." Natural Laws clearly indicate that Father's is
to serve his children in the capacity of a highly-valued roles of provider, protector, role-model and family leader, facts which have
been clearly established throughout human history and tradition. Through its anti-Father AND Anti-Male AND Anti-Family rulings AND
with no legal basis to do so the Circuit Court for Howard County Maryland, and the State of Maryland, have engaged in what can only
be defined as the arbitrary classification of all males. The actions of this Court AND this State, have no basis in Constitutional Law,
AND offends countless principles of justice that are so deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of our Nation's people, AND
which are considered fundamental principles of the family by these very people.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "a ... State may a serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments,' New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 , 311 (dissenting opinion), I do not believe that this includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens a" "The vice of the dissenters' views is that it would permit such
experimentation by the States in the area of the fundamental personal rights of its citizens. I cannot agree that the Constitution grants such power either to the States or to the Federal Government." The systematic exclusion of Fathers from the traditional Family by the Courts, represents little more than a "social experiment" which violates Natural Law and the fundamental personal rights of its citizens. As such, the Court's social-experiment - the systematic exclusion of Fathers from the lives of their children - in the absense of any law breaking or wrong doing on the part of the Father - IS UnConstitutional. Based up the state of the American Family AND Our Nation, this social experiment as clearly gone-awry, and must be immediately eliminated from Our Families and Our Nation.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "the Government, absent a showing of a compelling subordinating state interest, could not decree a." [381 U.S. 479, 497] "Yet by their reasoning such an invasion of marital privacy would not be subject to constitutional challenge because, while it might be "silly," no provision of the Constitution specifically prevents the Government from curtailing the marital right to bear children and raise a family." "a the Court today holds that the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against such totalitarian[ism] a, which is at complete variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing [voluntary birth control] by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected." Just as the Government does not have the Constitutional authority to interject itself into the issue regarding the decision by it's Citizens to bear children, so it is also true that the same Government does not have the Constitutional authority to interject itself into any issue regarding the raising of those children once they are born unless AND until the law abiding parents are "clearly established to be unfit as parents" or engage any some other form(s) of lawlessness. By extension, it holds true that the offspring of Citizens are not wards of, nor property of, the Government OR it's Courts, and therefore beyond the authority of the Government or it's Courts so long as those Citizens AND off spring are abiding by the Constitutionally authorized laws of this Nation.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling," Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 . The law must
be shown "necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 . See Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "...law obviously encroaches upon a fundamental personal liberty, the State does not show that the law serves any "subordinating [state] interest which is compelling" or that it is "necessary [381 U.S. 479, 498] a to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." The State, at most, argues that there is some rational relation between this statute and what is admittedly a legitimate subject of state concern. The rationality of this justification is dubious, a see Tileston v.
Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A. 2d 582. "But, in any event, it is clear that the state interest can be served by a more discriminately
tailored statute, which does not, like the present one, sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil sought to be
dealt with and intruding upon the privacy of all married couples. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 ; NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 -308; McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 196. Here, as elsewhere, where, "[p]recision of regulation must be
the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438. "... without the need
to "invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 307. See McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 196.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , the Court, referring to the Fourteenth Amendment, stated: "While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also [for example,] the right ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children"

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "This Court, in a series of decisions, has held that the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and applies to the States those specifics of the first eight amendments which express fundamental personal rights. The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments. The Ninth Amendment reads, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The Amendment is almost entirely the work of James Madison. It was
introduced in Congress by him and passed the House and Senate with little or no debate and virtually no change in language. It was
proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all
essential [381 U.S. 479, 489] rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial that others were
protected. In presenting the proposed Amendment, Madison said: "It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen
may see by turning to the [381 U.S. 479, 490] last clause of the fourth resolution [the Ninth Amendment]." Annals of Congress 439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834).

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "This clause (9th Amendment) was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication of the well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all others;
and, e converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an affirmation in all others." Id., at 651. "These statements of
Madison and Story make clear that the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and
fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "While this Court has had little occasion to interpret the Ninth Amendment, "[i]t cannot be presumed that any [381 U.S. 479, 491] clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174. In interpreting the Constitution, "real effect should be given to all the words it uses." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151. The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution may be regarded by some as a recent discovery and may be forgotten by others, but since 1791 it has been a basic part of the Constitution which we are sworn to uphold. To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever. Moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamental right is not protected by the Constitution because it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the Ninth Amendment, which specifically states that [381 U.S. 479, 492] "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the Constitution's authors that other fundamental personal rights should not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight constitutional amendments. I do not see how this broadens the authority [381 U.S. 479, 493] of the Court; rather it serves to support what this Court has been doing in protecting fundamental rights. "

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 , held simply that a State could not, consistently with due process, refuse a lawyer a license to practice law on the basis of a finding that he was morally unfit when there was no evidence in the record, 353 U.S., at 246 -247, to support such a finding."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "See Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment (1955). "Mr. Patterson urges that the Ninth Amendment be used to protect unspecified "natural and inalienable rights." P. 4. The Introduction by Roscoe Pound states that "there is a marked revival of natural law ideas throughout the world. Interest in the Ninth Amendment is a symptom of that revival." P. iii. In Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People"?, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 787, Professor Redlich, in advocating reliance on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to invalidate the Connecticut law before us, frankly states: "But for one who feels that the marriage relationship should be beyond the reach of a state law a, the a case poses a troublesome and challenging problem of constitutional interpretation. He may find himself saying, `The law is unconstitutional - but why?' There are two possible paths to travel in finding the answer. One is to revert to a frankly flexible due process concept even on matters that do not involve specific constitutional prohibitions. The other is to attempt to evolve a new constitutional framework within which to meet this and similar problems which are likely to arise." Id., at 798." The Courts finding was that a citizen had absolute freedom from the state with respect to the parents decision to produce offspring. By Natural extension, this same Constitutional protection must be extended to include protection from those same States following the birth of these "protected" children. Insofar as no Constitutionally recognized laws are broken by these citizens (parents and children) - the "sacred familial domain" must be "Constitutionally Protected from the Arbitrary and unlawful interjection by the States' and their illegal courts.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "Compare Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 , upholding a New York dog-licensing statute on the ground that it did not "deprive dog owners of liberty without due process of law." And as I said concurring in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 , "I believe that faithful adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection of individual libertya"

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment, like its companion the Tenth, which this Court held "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124, was framed by James Madison and adopted by the States simply to make clear that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not alter the plan that [381 U.S. 479, 530] the Federal Government was to be a government of express and limited powers, and that all rights and powers not delegated to it were retained by the people and the individual States."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins, dissenting. "The Ninth Amendment, like its companion the Tenth, which this Court held "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 , was framed by James Madison and adopted by the States simply to make clear that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not alter the plan that [381 U.S. 479, 530] the Federal Government was to be a government of express and limited powers, and that all rights and powers not delegated to it were retained by the people and the individual States."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "At the oral argument in this case we were told that the Connecticut law does not "conform to current community standards." But it is not the function of this Court to decide cases on the basis of community standards. We are here to decide cases "agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. It is the essence of judicial [381 U.S. 479, 531] duty to subordinate our own personal views..."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Amendments in question were, as everyone knows, originally adopted as limitations upon the power of the newly created Federal Government, not as limitation upon the powers of the individual States. But the Court has held that many of the provisions of the first eight amendments are fully embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment as limitations upon state action, and some members of the Court have held the view that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment made every provision of the first eight amendments fully applicable against the States. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 .

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The first 10 amendments were proposed and adopted largely because of fear that Government might unduly interfere with prized individual liberties. The people wanted and demanded a Bill of Rights written into their Constitution. The amendments embodying the Bill of Rights were intended to curb all branches of the Federal Government in the fields touched by the amendments-Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments were pointedly
aimed at confining exercise of power by courts and judges within precise boundaries, particularly in the procedure used for the trial
of criminal cases. Past history provided strong reasons [332 U.S. 46 , 71] for the apprehensions which brought these procedural
amendments into being and attest the wisdom of their adoption. For the fears of arbitrary court action sprang largely from the past use
of courts in the imposition of criminal punishments to suppress [ion of] speech, press, and religion. Hence the constitutional
limitations of courts' powers were, in the view of the Founders, essential supplements to the First Amendment, which was itself
designed to protect the widest scope for all people to believe and to express the most divergent political, religious, and other
views." "With full knowledge of the import of the Barron decision, the framers and backers of the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its
purpose to be to overturn the constitutional rule that case had announced aIn construing other constitutional provisions, this Court
has almost uniformly followed the precept of Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 , 787, that 'It is never to be forgotten that in the
construction of the language of the Constitution, as indeed in all other instances where construction becomes necessary, we are to
place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed that instrument.' See also Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 , 67 S. Ct. 504; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 , 95, 102, 740, 744; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 89 , 106, 766, 772;
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 ; Barron v. Baltimore, supra, Pet. at pages 250, 251; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 416-420.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "...this Court also held in a number of cases that [colored] people must, because of the Fourteenth Amendment, be accorded equal protection of the laws. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 ; cf. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 ; see also Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 ." a "when Munn v. Illinois, supra, was decided, this Court steadfastly declined to invalidate states' legislative regulation of property rights or business practices under the Fourteenth Amendment unless there were [racial] discrimination involved in the state law challenged. The first significant breach in this policy came in
1889, in Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 702. "A state's railroad rate regulatory statute was there stricken
as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was accomplished by reference to a due process formula which did not necessarily operate so as to protect the Bill of Rights' personal liberty safeguards, but which gave a new and hitherto
undiscovered scope for the Court's use of the due process clause to protect property rights under natural law concepts. And in 1896, in
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 , [332 U.S. 46 , 80] this Court, in effect, overruled Davidson v. New Orleans, supra, by holding, under the new due process-natural law formula, that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade a state from taking privatea." "Later decisions of this Court have completely undermined the phase of the Twining doctrine which broadly precluded reliance on the Bill of Rights to determine what is and what is not a 'fundamental' right. Later cases have also made the Hurtado case an inadequate support for this phase of the Twining formula. For despite Hurtado and Twining, this Court has now held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects from state invasion the following 'fundamental' rights safeguarded by the Bill of Rights: right to counsel in criminal cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 , 63, 84, A.L.R. 527, limiting the Hurtado case; see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 ,
and De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 ; freedom of assembly, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 , 259; at the very least, certain types of cruel and unusual punishment and former jeopardy, State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 ; the right of an accused in a criminal case to be in- [332 U.S. 46 , 85] formed of the charge against him, see Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 332, 90 A.L.R. 575; the right to receive just compensation on account of taking private property for public use, Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 . And the Court has now through the Fourteenth Amendment literally and emphatically applied the First Amendment to the States in its very terms. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 ; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 , 1186, 147 A.L.R. 674; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 , 196, 159 A.L.R. 1346."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "I cannot consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century 'strait jacket' as the Twining opinion did. Its provisions may be thought outdated abstractions by some. a In my judgment the people of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a Bill of Rights like ours survives and its basic purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced and
respected so as to afford continuous protection against old, as well as new, devices and practices which might thwart those purposes. I fear to see the consequences of the Court's practice of substituting its own concepts of decency and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as its point of departure in interpreting and enforcing that Bill of Rights. If the choice must be between the selective process of the Palk decision applying some of the Bill of Rights to the States, or the Twining rule applying none of them, I
would choose the Palko selective process. But rather than accept either of these choices. I would follow what I believe was the
original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights.
To hold that this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to
frustrate the great design of a written Constitution. [332 U.S. 46, 90].

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 'a the first ten Amendments were adopted as limitations on Federal power, yet in so far as they secure and recognize fundamental [332 U.S. 46, 122] rights-common law rights-of the man, they make them privileges and immunities of the man as citizen of the United States, and cannot now be abridged by a State
under the Fourteenth Amendment.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "Mr. Justice Field in his dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 , 361, 698, 707, stated that 'after much reflection' he had become persuaded that the definition of privileges and immunities given by Mr. Tucker in Spies v. Illinois, supra, 'is correct.' And Mr. Justice Field went on to say that 'While, therefore, the ten
amendments as limitations on power, and, so far as they accomplish their purpose and find their fruition in such limitations, are
applicable only to the federal government and not to the states, yet, so far as they declare or recognize the rights of persons they
are rights belonging to them as citizens of the United States under the constitution; and the fourteenth amendment, as [332 U.S. 46 ,
123] to all such rights, places a limit upon state power by ordaining that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge them."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "every citizen of the United States is protected from punishments which are cruel and unusual. It is an immunity which belongs to him, against both state and federal action. The state cannot apply to him, any more than the United States, the torture, the rack, or thumb-screw, or any cruel and unusual punishment, or any more than it can deny to him security in his house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, or compel him to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution. These rights, as those of citizens of the United States, find their recognition and guaranty against federal
action in the constitution of the United States, and against state action in the fourteenth amendment. The inhibition by that amendment
is not the less valuable and effective because of the prior and existing inhibition against such action in the constitutions of the
several states. 144 U.S. at page 363, 12 S.Ct. at page 708.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital
sexuality . . . or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in
it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy." GIVEN that the intimacy between the law
abiding Parties is "Constitutionally off limits and beyond the regulation of the Courts", so-too, must be the result(s) of that
intimacy (the law abiding Parties unemancipated minor children) be ""Constitutationally off-limits" so long as "the Parties remain
law abiding" AND are "not clearly established as unfit parents."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In the final analysis, it seems to me that the Boyd doctrine, though perhaps not
required by the express language of the Constitution strictly construed, is amply justified from an historical standpoint, soundly
based in reason, [367 U.S. 643, 663] and entirely consistent with what I regard to be the proper approach to interpretation of our
Bill of Rights - an approach well set out by Mr. Justice Bradley in the Boyd case: "Constitutional provisions for the security of person
and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." And yet, in spite of the Constitutional
protections that are clearly in place, the Circuit Court for Howard County Maryland, and the State of Maryland, have illegal interjected
themselves into the private sanctity of the law abiding Parties' familial domain, and willfully attempted to damage, if not
altogether destroy, the critical relationship between the plaintiff and his unemancipated minor children - in violation of Natural Law,
in the total absence of a lawful suspension of Writ of Habeas Corpus, and is therefore in violation of numerous Rights and
Protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), When we allowed States to give constitutional sanction to the "shabby business" of unlawful entry into a home (to use an expression of Mr. Justice Murphy, Wolf v. Colorado, at 46), we did indeed rob the Fourth Amendment of much meaningful force."

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), " a the principle of privacy "which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment." (Id., at 27.) It would not be proper to expect or impose any precise equivalence, either as regards the scope of the right or the means
of its implementation, between the requirements of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. For the Fourth, unlike what was said in Wolf of the Fourteenth, does not state a general principle only; it is a particular command, having its setting in a pre-existing legal
context on which both interpreting decisions and enabling statutes must at least build." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, "Seventy-five
years ago, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), considering the Fourth 4 and Fifth Amendments as running "almost
into each other" on the facts before it, this Court held that the doctrines of those Amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of
the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, [367 U.S. 643, 647] that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property." The Plaintiff, AND the Parties, are law abiding citizens of the
United States, have never been charge OR adjudicated as "unlawful" or "clearly established as unfit to parent." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656, The Court noted that: "constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed aIt is
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." At p.
635." The Circuit Court of Howard County, the State of Maryland, and all States within the United States, have indeed been "stealthy" in
their systematic encroachment upon the Rights of the Citizens of the Unites States of America. However, the Plaintiff (and countless
Fathers throughout this land) now have their eyes fully opened, and are cognizant of the fact that their basic Civil and Human Rights
are being systematically encroached upon by the States and their illegal courts. As guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the
Plaintiff (and countless Fathers throughout this land), are also now very cognizant of the fact that they have the absolute Right to be
Let Alone, (The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold,55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960). Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 . "We find that, as to the Federal Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from
unconscionable invasions of privacy.....,' Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 -544 "The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence -" 367 U.S., at 656 -657.

BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), "Court held that the doctrines of those Amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, [367 U.S. 643, 647] that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property."

MALLOY v. HOGAN, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), "In 1961, the [378 U.S. 1, 6] Court held that in the light of later decisions, it was taken as settled that "athe Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenta"

STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), "1. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment petitioner was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him. Pp. 647-658." "(b) The State cannot, consistently with due process requirements, merely presume that [unmarried] fathers in general and petitioner in particular are unsuitable and neglectful parents. Parental unfitness must be established on the basis of individualized proof. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 . Pp. 649-
658.

STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), "The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), "basic civil rights of man,"
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and "rights far more precious . . . than property rights," May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).

STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation [of those children] for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 399, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 541, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)."

SKINNER v. STATE OF OKL. EX REL. WILLIAMSON, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ".one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental rights..." Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992), the
court observed that the Supreme Court has "recognized the fact that the writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.' Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). "Therefore,
the writ must be "administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach
are surfaced and corrected." Harris, 394 U.S. at 291. Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "The writ of habeas corpus serves as an important check on the manner in which state courts pay respect to federal constitutional rights. The writ is "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state
action." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "The Court observed that"[t]he writ of habeas corpus is one of the centerpieces of our liberties." Brown v.
Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "Dismissal of habeas petition under the "total
exhaustion" rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982). Each of the claims raised by petitioner must be exhausted before district
court may reach the merits of any claim in habeas petition. Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if it can be established that the constitutional error
had "substantial and injurious effecta" Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 & n.9 (1993). Whether the constitutional error was
harmless is not a factual determination entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). Dickson, 849
F.2d at 405; Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1987)." What could be more "substantial and injurious" to a law abiding
Citizen of the United States AND a loving and committed Parent, than the unlawful denial of a sustained and healthy relationship with his legitimated, unemancipated minor children? Through the illegal and unconstitutional actions of the Circuit Court for Howard County which represents nothing short of "systemic-wrongs" being perpetrated against the absolutely law abiding, loving and committed
Plaintiff/Father. Through it's illegal actions, the Circuit Court for Howard County is inflicting extreme pain and suffering upon the
Parties unemancipated minor children, which they would never been subjected to had these governmental entities simply "minded there own business" (The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold,55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960) and left the private matters of the law abiding familial domain, to those best-equipped to address those matters û THE PARTIES. See Also: O'NEIL v. VERMONT, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); TWINING v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); U.S. v. DARBY, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 399;Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.105 , 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 82; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct. 877, 882; MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

GARNER v. TEAMSTERS UNION, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), "(c) When federal power constitutionally is exerted for the protection of public or private interests, or both, it becomes the supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented or extended by a state procedure merely because such procedure will apply some doctrine of private right. Pp. 492-501. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental relationship with their children absent a
finding that they are unfit as parents."

ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. DOUGHTON, 262 U.S. 413 (1923) 262 U.S. 41, " an arbitrary classification is obnoxious to the equal protection clause, Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 , 30 Sup. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247." ARBITRARY Defined: adj. Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle. Based on or subject to individual judgment or preference. Established by a court or judge rather than by a specific law or statute. Not limited by law; despotic.

According to the Crowley Amicus, Franz v United States (over Bork's dissent), as someone mentioned on the list did address, for the first time approached a non-custodial parent rights:

Similarly, the D.C. Circuit holds that a non-custodial parent’s fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his child and directing the child’s education and upbringing survives a divorce decree. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 594-95 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Franz, a non-custodial father lost contact with his children when they went into the witness protection program with their mother and step-father. In response to the father’s claim of a substantive due process right to maintain a relationship with his children, the court observed that while the right is “acknowledged to be potent,” it might be argued that it is “less formidable when asserted by a non-custodial parent – one who retains and regularly exercises ‘visitation rights’ but who participates little in the day-to-day care and nurturing of his children.” Id. at 595.

The court then rejected this argument, concluding that “the bulk of the pertinent precedent seems to suggest that we should not differentiate between custodial and non-custodial contexts when deciding what protections are constitutionally due a parent-child relationship.” Id. at 595-96 (collecting cases). The court also conducted an extensive analysis focusing on the importance of parent-child relations in our culture, the social functions served by shielding such relations, and 16 the profound importance of the parent-child bond to the emotional life of both. Id. at 597-602. It concluded that the non-custodial father’s interests were in critical respects comparable.

Parental unfitness is not focused upon "whether the parent is a good one, let alone an ideal one; rather, the inquiry is whether the parent is so bad as to place the child at serious risk of peril from abuse, neglect, or other activity harmful to the child." Care & Protection of Bruce, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 761 (1998). "Parental unfitness . . . means more than ineptitude, handicap, character flaw, conviction of a crime, unusual life style, or inability to do as good a job as the child's foster parent. Rather, the idea of 'parental unfitness'
means 'grievous shortcomings or handicaps' that put the child's welfare much at hazard. (Footnotes omitted.) Adoption of Katharine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 28 (1997), quoting [from] Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 646 (1975)." Adoption of Greta, 431 Mass. 577, 587 (2000).

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